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ABSTRACT
Intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states by other sovereign state(s) is one
of the ‘hot’ issues in international law today. The issue is ‘hot’ because the concept of human
rights is on the ascendancy whilst international law had from time immemorial held the concept
of sovereignty and its key feature, the principle of non-interference in high esteem. In fact, the
concept of sovereignty has long been regarded as the bedrock of international relations.
However, the doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention allows state(s) to intervene in the
domestic affairs of sovereign states in the event of massive human rights violations, usually in
the form of mass murders and genocide. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention, therefore, is
an affront to one of the core principles of international law, namely, “non-interference” and as
such its validity is hotly contested. This paper examines the legality of the doctrine of unilateral
humanitarian intervention.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention has been in existence and debated for
the past several hundreds of years. However, the legality of this doctrine in international relations
has always been subject to some debate because it is in direct conflict with one of the most
fundamental norms in international relations, the principle of state sovereignty.
State sovereignty has, for the past several hundred years, been the defining principle of
interstate relations and a foundation of world order. The concept finds expression at the roots of
both customary law and the United Nations (UN) Charter. It remains one of the cardinal
principles in international law and plays a pivotal role in the maintenance of world peace and
order.
Perhaps, the singular most important attribute of the principle of state sovereignty is the
principle of non-intervention, which denounces all forms of interference in the internal affairs of
sovereign states. This principle postulates that each sovereign state should freely make its own
choice in respect of the political and socio-economic policies, the culture to be adopted and so
on. Briefly put, sovereignty means the independence, competence and legal equality of all states.
The doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention is of great importance in
international law, and has grown in prominence in the last few decades. The term normally
denotes an armed interference by one or several states in the internal affairs of another state,
without its prior consent, in order to curtail gross human rights violations in the state. Unilateral
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humanitarian intervention, therefore, necessarily violates the sovereignty of the target state by
interfering in the domestic affairs of the target state.
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention conflicts with one of the fundamental
principles of international law. Therefore a clear legal justification is needed in order to warrant
its continue use. The moral justification, de lege ferenda is not hard to find. However, the legal
basis, de lege lata is very difficult to ascertain.
In contemporary times, the legality of this doctrine remains one of the most controversial
issues in international law. Many governments and scholars are resolute in their belief that the
United Nations (UN Charter), which regulates the use of force in international relations,
prohibits all unilateral use of force, including humanitarian intervention. However, a growing
number of scholars argue forcefully that unilateral humanitarian intervention is legal, or at least,
a limited right exists.
In this dissertation I will assess the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention in
international law. I will examine the legality of the doctrine from two perspectives, first under
the UN Charter and second, under Customary International Law since these are the two main
sources of international law. It is important to state that the customary law rules on a subject
could be different from that of treaties. This is important because the rules stipulated in a treaty
are binding on only parties to that treaty but the rules of customary international law are
generally binding on all states except states that objected to the rule during its development
stages. Since the UN Charter is a treaty and binding on only members, it is essential to examine
the customary law rules on unilateral humanitarian intervention after considering the rules stated
in the UN Charter. I will refer to those scholars who postulate that unilateral humanitarian
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intervention is legal [under UN Charter] as the Realists, whilst those who posit that the doctrine
is illegal as the Classicists.
Chapter 2 discusses the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, its definition, purposes, its
evolution and status before the formation of the UN. It also examines ‘humanitarian
interventions’ before the UN Charter. It concludes that a right of unilateral humanitarian
intervention existed before the establishment of the UN.
Chapter 3 discusses the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention under the UN
Charter. It examines the provisions of the Charter on the use of force, espousing arguments by
realists and classicists on the legality of the doctrine under the UN Charter. It examines textual
arguments, intent arguments as well as policy arguments posited by realists and classicists. It
concludes by noting that unilateral humanitarian intervention is not permitted by the UN Charter.
Chapter 4 discusses the rules regarding the formation of customary rules of international
law. It examines whether the doctrine of unilateral humanitarian has evolved into a rule of
customary international law. It concludes that unilateral humanitarian intervention is not a rule of
customary international law. It is however admitted that there is ample evidence to the effect that
unilateral humanitarian intervention is gradually developing into a rule of customary
international law. Finally, I conclude that though the doctrine of unilateral humanitarian
intervention is presently illegal under international law, it plays an important role in world affairs
and should be permitted in situations of gross violations of human rights. However, clear criteria
must be laid down to regulate the use of the doctrine in order to minimize the possibility of
abuse.
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CHAPTER 2
SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
I. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION
State sovereignty has been the defining principle of intestate relations and a foundation
for world order for the past several hundreds of years.1 The concept is one of the fundamental
principles of international law, both under the United Nations Charter (UN Charter) and
customary international law, and plays an important role in the maintenance of international
peace and security and a defense of weak states against the strong.2
State sovereignty refers to the competence, independence, and legal equality of states.3
Entailed in the concept are all matters in which each state is permitted by international law to
decide and act without recourse to other sovereign states.4 Examples of such matters include the
political system to be employed by the state as well as economic, cultural and social systems.5 In
these matters, each state possesses the right to choose whichever system it prefers.
The concept of state sovereignty has been in existence for several centuries. However, a
number of international law scholars agree that the present foundations of international law as it
relates to sovereignty were highly influenced by the agreements reached by European states as
part of the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648.6 The supremacy of the sovereign authority was

1

See: The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty at
(http://www.iciss.ca/menu-en.asp).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Francis Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention 26-7 (The Hague:
Kluwer, 1999); Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values 9-10 (London: Martinus Nijihoff, 1995);
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established within a system of independent and equal states as a measure to avoid another war
after nearly three decades of war, and thus establish peace and order in Europe.7
It is pertinent to know the essential elements of statehood because, for an entity to be
entitled to sovereignty, that entity must qualify as a state. The Montevideo Convention laid down
the essential elements of statehood.8 The main elements of statehood, as established by the
Convention, include having a permanent population, a defined territory and a functioning
government.
The United Nations Charter recognized state sovereignty as one of the fundamental
principles of international law. The Charter accordingly adopted the principle of the sovereign
equality of all states.9 Flowing from the importance of the principle of the sovereign equality of
all states, the Charter sought to prohibit interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states by
other sovereign states, especially the threat or use of force.10 The Charter went further in its
desire to promote the sovereignty of states by stating that “[n]othing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter”.11 Thus, not even the global body has the right to interfere
in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state and therefore interfere in its enjoyment of its
sovereign status.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations, recognized the sanctity of the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of

Francis Hinsley, Sovereignty 126 (London: Basic Books, 1966); and Michael Reisman, “Sovereignty and Human
Rights in Contemporary International Law,” 84 Am. J. Int’l L. 867 (1990).
7
Stephen D. Krasner, “Compromising Westphalia”, 20 Int’l Sec. 115 (1995-6).
8
See the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.
9
U. N. Charter, art. 2(1).
10
U. N. Charter, art. 2(4).
11
U. N. Charter, art. 2(7).
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states. The Court noted in 1949 “between independent states, respect for territorial sovereignty is
an essential foundation of international relations.”12 Some three decades later, the ICJ observed
that the principle of non-intervention was “the fundamental principle of state sovereignty on
which the whole of international law rests.”13
Notwithstanding the importance and role of state sovereignty in international relations,
the limit of the principle has always been in dispute, and remains so now. The present
controversy emanates from the rise in the status of the principle of humanitarian intervention
which is inconsistent with ‘traditional’ notions of sovereignty. As has been noted in the report of
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty:
Few subjects in international law and international relations are as sensitive as the notion
of sovereignty. Steinberger refers to it in the Encyclopedia of Public International Law as
“the most glittering and controversial notion in the history, doctrine and practice of
international law.” On the other hand, Henkin seeks to banish it from our vocabulary and
Lauterpacht calls it a “word which has an emotive quality lacking meaningful specific
content,” while Verzijl notes that any discussion on this subject risks degenerating into a
Tower of Babel. More affirmatively, Brownlie sees sovereignty as “the basic
constitutional doctrine of the law of the law nations” and Alan James sees it as “the one
and only organising principle in respect of the dry surface of the globe, all that surface
now…being divided among single entities of a sovereign or constitutionally independent
kind.” As noted by Falk, “There is little neutral ground when it comes to sovereignty.”14
Despite the pivotal role of the concept of sovereignty in international relations, it has
been facing some challenges, especially in the last quarter of the 20th century.
II. DEFINITION OF UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Various scholars have defined intervention differently, and it is so with the concept of
humanitarian intervention.15 Intervention has been defined broadly to include even verbal

12

Asylum Case, ICJ Rep. (1949), 4.
Nicaragua Case, ICJ Rep. (1986), para. 264.
14
See the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
http://www.iciss.ca/menu-en.asp
15
George R. Wright, A Contemporary Theory of Humanitarian Intervention, 4 Fla. Int’l L. J. 435 (1989).
13
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remarks of government actors concerning another state’s affairs.16 On the other hand, some
writers have defined it narrowly to include only “dictatorial interference by a state in the internal
affairs of another state or in the relations between other states.”17
Customarily, when we refer to ‘intervention’, in international law, we refer to prohibited
intervention.18 One could however distinguish between basically three forms of “intervention”,
depending on the degree of coercion employed in order to influence other states.19 In the first
place, “intervention” simply means discussion, examination, and the recommendatory action.20
Second, “intervention” refers to the taking of measures that are coercive in nature but short of the
use of force.21 Finally, “intervention is used to refer to the use of force in the domestic affairs of
another state.22
Humanitarian intervention has been defined as the “justifiable use of force for the
purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment so arbitrary and persistently
abusive as to exceed the limits within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reasons and
justice.”23 It has also been defined as “the theory of intervention on the ground of humanity…
that recognizes the right of one state to exercise an international control by military force over
the acts of another in regard to its internal sovereignty when contrary to the law of humanity.”24
Teson, a contemporary international law scholar defines humanitarian intervention as “ the
proportionate transboundary help, including forcible help, provided by governments to

16

Id.
Id.
18
Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention 133 (2nd ed. 1997).
19
Id. at 135.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Ellery Stowell, International Law 349 (1931), quoted in Steve G. Simon, The Contemporary Legality of
Humanitarian Intervention, 24 Cal. W. Int’l L. J. 117, 118 (1993).
24
Steve G. Simon, The Contemporary Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, 24 Cal. W. Int’l L. J. 117, 118 (1993).
17
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individuals in another state who are being denied basic human rights and who themselves would
be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive government.”25
Although these definitions are not necessarily identical, they convey what the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention entails. They shed light on significant factors that must be identified
and understood in order to fully comprehend the issues involved in the doctrine. First, the use of
armed force is a common feature of all the definitions. Thus, humanitarian intervention connotes
rightly the use of military force in the internal affairs of a state by another state or group of
states. Second, for there to be humanitarian intervention, the justification for the use force
depends on human rights violations in the target state.
As stated by Teson, the customary meaning of prohibited intervention denotes
“dictatorial interference in the affairs of another state for purposes of altering or maintaining the
actual order of things” in a matter which is essentially within the discretion of the target state.26
Therefore, as rightly noted by Teson, for an intervention to be prohibited, the means used must
be coercive and the ends of the intervention must be to influence another state’s decision or
conduct in a matter that is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of that state.27
III. PURPOSES OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
A. CURTAILING MASSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
One of the main reasons advocated for humanitarian interventions is the prevention of
genocide and other mass murder of civilian populations by state actors against their own citizens.
Since 1900, it is estimated that governments and political leaders have killed about 169,198,000

25

Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An inquiry into Law and Morality 5 (1988).
Id.
27
Id.
26
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of their own citizens.28 This number is by far greater than the lives lost during all the wars in this
century.29
Humanitarian interventions have been undertaken in order to curtail massive human
rights abuses. The Idi Amin government of Uganda, during its reign from1971 to 1979,
committed widespread atrocities and massive human rights violations against its own citizens30
and Amnesty International characterized the regime as atrocious after uncovering executions,
rape and torture committed by the regime.31Tanzania intervened in Uganda in 1979 for
humanitarian reasons32 though it has been suggested that Tanzania had other primary reasons for
the intervention.33
Similarly, India intervened in East Bengali (now Bangladesh) in order to curtail massive
human rights violations. This was after the Pakistani Army had descended on the civilian
populace of East Bengali in “an orgy of killing, terror, and destruction which led to the loss of at
least one million lives.34 India’s intervention undoubtedly halted atrocities on a wide scale. India
cited human rights violations of the West Pakistanis and transborder aggression by the Pakistani
as reasons for the intervention.35 India’s representative to the United Nations, in justifying the
intervention stated thus: “we have … absolutely nothing but the purest of motives and the purest
of intentions: to rescue the people of East Bengal from what they are suffering.”36 It has been

28

Laura Geissler, The Law of Humanitarian Intervention and the Kosovo Crisis, 23 Hamline L. Rev. 323, 325
(2000).
29
Id.
30
Thomas M. Franck, Of Gnats and Camels: Is there a Double Standard at the United Nations? , 78 Am. J. Int’l L.
811, 825 (1984).
31

Amnesty International, Human Rights in Uganda, Report, June 1978, Doc. AFR 59/05/78.
Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality 164 (1988).
33
Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti-Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian
Intervention under International Law-Part I. 20 Denv. J. Int’l L. 305, 320 (1992).
34
Byron F. Burmester, On Humanitarian Intervention: The New World Order and Wars to Preserve Human Rights,
1994 Utah L. Rev. 269 (1994).
35
Douglas Eisner, Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 11 B. U. Int’l L. J. 195, 202 (1993).
36
Id.
32
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argued that India had other selfish motives for intervening in East Bengal, including splitting up
and weakening a powerful rival and thus enhancing its own security.37 That notwithstanding,
Bazyler asserts that India’s “course of action in the Bangladesh situation probably constitutes the
clearest case of forceful individual humanitarian intervention in this century,” emphasizing the
humanitarian nature of the intervention.38
Though most, if not all, of these interventions have been characterized as not genuine
humanitarian interventions, the fact that humanitarian concerns offered part of the justification
for the intervening states is not seriously doubted.
B. MAINTAINING REGIONAL AND GLOBAL STABILITY
Another espoused justification for humanitarian intervention is the maintenance of
regional and global security. When one state becomes insecure, such as an occurrence of
genocide, regional and global security is threatened. This is the result of refugees fleeing their
home country to neighboring ones to save their lives. For example, the Indian intervention in
East Bengal (now Bangladesh) could be attributed (at least partly) to the massive inflows of
refugees to India from East Bengal as a result of the mass murders and other atrocities committed
against the people of East Bengal by the Pakistan army.39 It is estimated that an approximately
ten million East Bengalis fled to India, causing the country tremendous hardship.40
Again, the Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS) assisted the United States to
intervene in Grenada in 1983. Grenada descended into chaos after the Grenadian People’s
Revolutionary Army led a coup against Grenada’s government and killed Prime Minister

37

Id.
Michael J. Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of the Atrocities in
Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 Stan. J. Int’l L. 547, 589 (1987).
39
A. C. Arend and R. J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force 113-4 (London, Routledge, 1993).
40
Douglas Eisner, Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 11 B. U. Int’l L. J. 195, 202 (1993).
38
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Maurice Bishop and three other officials.41 Though the United States led the operation apparently
to rescue United States medical students in Grenada; the OECS found the civil strife and
breakdown in government to constitute a security threat to their nations and resolved to use force
to ensure peace.42 That provided the justification for the OECS assistance to the United States in
the Grenada intervention.
Further, there is the tendency that dictators may think that they have become ‘too
powerful’ and try to encroach on the sovereignty of neighboring countries. Hitler’s regime in
Germany thought it had grown so powerful and started attacking neighboring countries without
just cause. The end result was World War II that devastated the world.
IV. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

OF

THE

PRINCIPLE

OF

UNILATERAL

A. THE LAW OF NATURE
In the early development of western culture, Greek philosophers began arguing about the
existence of a universal law of nature, which everybody was obliged to obey and all positive
laws had to conform to. Aristotle (284-322 BC) made some fundamental assumptions about this
natural law thus: “One part of what is politically just is natural, and the other part legal. What is
natural is what has same validity everywhere alike.”43
However, this theory was not developed further until much later when the Stoics
developed a coherent theory about the Law of Nature. They saw the natural law as something
that was part of the structure of the universe, and directed the actions of rational beings. They

41

Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti-Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian
Intervention under International Law-Part I. 20 Denv. J. Int’l L. 305, 322 (1992).
42
John N. Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 Am. J. Int’l L. 145, 148 (1984).
43
Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nichomachean Ethics 20 (1953).
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thus believed that the Law of Nature was conceivable a priori,44 universal and applied to all
individuals alike.
The Law of Nature was the philosophical underpinnings of several basic norms, both
legal and moral. It is an essential feature of the Law of Nature that all human beings be treated
equally45 and can therefore be regarded as the foundation of the concept of inherent human
rights. This Law constituted the rational basis of political society and formed the foundation on
which the social contract theory and state sovereignty were based in the early days of
civilization.
B. JUST WAR THEORIES
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is historically strongly tied to the moralpolitical theory of just war (bellum justum). The ancient Greeks opined that war must not be
waged unless the cause for waging it was justified. The Christian church in its formative years
was largely pacifist (anti-war) and refused to accept any justification for waging war, no matter
the circumstance.
St. Augustine (354-430) was the first major theologian who postulated a theory of just
war. Basically, he sought to reconcile the political reality of war with the Christian model of
pacifism. He laid down a criterion that if met, would justify the waging of war. He relied on two
key concepts, namely, a just cause and a right intention. Incidentally, these concepts formed the
very basis of Christian moral theory existing at the time. It was imperative to ascertain the
justness of an action by evaluating the intention behind the particular act. St. Augustine, writing
on the legality of war, said: “Just wars are usually defined as those which avenge injuries, when

44

That this law was conceivable by the mere exercise of reason, and everybody had the power of reason because
God had endowed every human being with it. Every human being was therefore capable of conceiving the natural
law.
45
See generally Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nichomachean Ethics.
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the nation or city against which warlike action is to be directed has neglected either to punish
wrongs committed by its own citizens or to restore what has been unjustly taken by it. Further,
that kind of war is undoubtedly just which God Himself ordains”.46
Over time, Christian concepts became increasingly influential in the sphere of political
theory. This led to the establishment and acceptance of the theory of bellum justum that became
an essential foundation of the rules of war.
St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) sought to propound his own theory about just wars, but
this was largely based on the model developed by St. Augustine. He laid less emphasis on
pacifist commands from the bible that prohibited all wars whatsoever. He concluded that there is
no general prohibition on war and that when certain requirements are met; a war could be waged
justly.
First, it had to be waged by a competent authority, which authority he referred to as ‘the
authority of [P]rinces or of the [C]hurch.’47 Second, there must be a just cause for the war,
meaning, “that those who are attacked merit the attack because of some fault (culpa).”48 He gave
examples of just wars as wars fought in self-defense; restoration of peace; assistance of
neighbors against armed attack and most importantly, ‘defense of the poor and oppressed’
(emphasis added).49 Finally, a just war had to be waged with a right intention.
Hugo Grotius, the man widely regarded as the father of international law was the first
western philosopher who sought to separate the law of nature from the law of God.50 Perhaps
Grotius’ singular most important contribution to legal theory is his application of the concept of
46

Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, quoted in Dunoff et al, International
Law: Norms, Actors, Process; A Problem Oriented Approach 827 (2002).
47

Summa Theologica II, II, 188, para 4.
Id II, II, 40, para 1.
49
Id II, II, 188, para 3.
50
M. D. A. Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence 100 (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 6th ed. 1994).
48
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natural law to international law. He built his Law of Nations on his view of the Law of Nature.51
He argued that the individual possessed some inherent rights, emphasizing that nation-states
came into existence because individuals wanted to improve their security and as a result ceded
part of their inherent rights to the state. The sovereign powers of the state were therefore limited
to the extent of the rights ceded by individuals.
Therefore, the state exceeded its authority when it denied individuals their basic rights
that they had not ceded to the state. It follows that if the sovereign violated the basic rights of the
people, he exceeded his jurisdiction and other states had the right to intervene and re-establish
the order of the Law of Nature. He put it this way:
Certainly it is undoubted that ever since civil societies were formed, the rulers of each
claimed some special rights over his own subjects. [But] … if a tyrant practices atrocities
towards his subjects, which no just man can approve, the right of human social connexion
is not cut off in such a case. It would not follow that others may not take up arms for
them.52
The statement above and others by Grotius compelled Lauterpacht to state that perhaps
Grotius was the first person to authoritatively state the principle of humanitarian intervention.
Lauterpacht states: “Grotius [made] the first authoritative statement of the principle of
humanitarian intervention – the principle that exclusiveness of domestic jurisdiction stops when
outrage upon humanity begins.”53
Grotius was of the view that intention was irrelevant for the justice of war but considered
in detail the justifiable means of waging war.54 He asserted that the issue of the justifiable means
was contingent on the justifiability of the cause for waging the war. He propounded a theory of

51

M. D. A. Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence 99 (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 6th ed. 1994).
Id II, XXV, para 6(3).
53
H. Lauterpacht quoted in P. Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force 7
(Amsterdam, Het Spinhuis, 1993).
54
L.R.B. Walters, Five Classic Just –War Theories: A Study in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas, Victoria, Suarez,
Gentili, and Grotius 353 (Michigan, University Films, 1971).
52
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proportionality, by holding that any means outside what is necessary for achieving the just cause,
would be unjust:55 “The good which our action has in view [must be] much greater than the evil
which is feared, unless, [when] the good and evil in balance, the hope of the good is much
greater than the fear of the evil.”56
Grotius concluded that certain actions were essentially prohibited no matter what the
justification is. This included the killing of civilians that he considered to be the principal crime
of war, the raping of women from the enemy side and the forcing of innocent people into
slavery.57 He however pointed out that sometimes the necessities of war would result in a
justifiable violation of the norms that he considered essentially prohibited:
Many things accompany the right of the agent indirectly and beyond the agent’s
intention. … Thus in order to obtain what is ours, if we cannot get that alone, we have the
right to take more. Similarly, we may bombard a ship full of pirates or a house full of
thieves, even if there are within the same ship or house a few infants, women or other
innocent persons.58
A survey of the views of the natural law thinkers in the 16th and 17th centuries indicate
clearly that they considered humanitarian intervention as legal and an integral part of the doctrine
of bellum justum and in conformity with the law of nature. Wars were not legal per se, but if the
stated conditions were met, wars could legally be waged. Thus, natural law put certain
limitations on the independence and sovereignty of states by holding that a state could intervene
in the affairs of another if certain conditions existed.
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C. TOWARDS A JUS AD BELLUM FOR THE SOVEREIGN STATE
The views posited by Grotius led to a change in the paradigm of political and legal
theory, shifting the emphasis away from the influence of Christian doctrine, resulting in a more
realistic view of the theory of sovereignty and the law of war.
Machiavelli, a great ‘political realist,’ sought to write about politics as it was at the time
and not as it ought to be. He realized that in renaissance Europe, the Princes did whatever suited
them and there were no limitations on their power, internally and externally. He concluded that
the sovereign did not have a moral superior; the moral good of the society is what the Prince
considered it to be. In relation to war, he stated thus:
When it is a question of the safety of the country no account should be taken of what is
just or unjust, merciful or cruel, laudable or shameful, but without regard to anything
else, that course is to be unswervingly pursued which will save the life and pursue the
liberty of the [fatherland].59
Bodin was one of the first scholars to develop a coherent theory on the principle of
sovereignty. He held a view similar to that of Machiavelli. He posited that the sovereign, as
supreme legislator, was free from any restraints posed by positive law.60 The sovereignty of the
nation-state was therefore virtually unlimited.
Hobbes, a predecessor of Bodin, was of the view that people had formed societies to
protect them from anarchy.61 He posited that as long as the government protects the majority of
the people, the people had to obey the laws unconditionally. This absolute sovereignty also
applied externally; therefore no other state had the right to interfere with the sovereign’s
treatment of his own people.
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John Locke also agreed that the social contract was the foundation of society. Though, he
argued from a somewhat weaker position of sovereignty, he nevertheless held that the sovereign
held wide discretionary powers both externally and internally.62
It is significant to note that these theories of sovereignty were developed in light of the
religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries that had caused constant disorders in Europe. It is
therefore not surprising that the principle of sovereignty got its legal confirmation in the treaty of
Westphalia, which ended the thirty years of war. This treaty inaugurated the modern European
state system and established the nation-state as the principal actor in international law.63
The treaty however put limited restraints on the sovereign’s power, especially regarding
the practice of religion, which was the dominant political issue. The Princes could determine the
principal religion within their territory, but minorities had the freedom to practice whichever
religion they chose.64 Thus, even the strict principle of sovereignty of the 17th century had some
important limitations.
It is significant to note that the theory of sovereignty that was developing in the 18th and
19th century differed fundamentally from that postulated in the teachings of Grotius. Notions
such as ‘justice’ or ‘humanity’ did not restrict the sovereignty of the nation-state, and therefore
humanitarian intervention could not be regarded as lawful. According to Brownlie, the concept
of just war was relegated ‘to the realms of morality and propaganda’.65 Instead, as Vattel noted, a
principle of non-intervention was developed:
It clearly follows from the liberty an independence of Nations that each has the right to
govern itself as it thinks proper. …No foreign State may enquire into the manner in
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which a sovereign rules, nor set itself up as judge of his conduct, nor force him to make
any change in his administration.66
Vattel, however, later made a modest change to this view when he recognized that under
certain circumstances states may intervene in the affairs of each other.67 Other contemporary
scholars recognized a limited right of intervention on humanitarian grounds. However, this was
not in accordance with the legal and political realities of the time.
This does not mean war was considered illegal per se, but the justification for waging war
was no longer found in a concept of justice. The justa causa had been replaced by a customary
right to go to war in accordance with the virtually unlimited sovereignty enjoyed by States.68
States were thus said to have a competence de guerre.69 Thus, Kunz noted: “The concept of
bellum legale replaced the concept of bellum justum.”70
Therefore, in the 18th and 19th centuries, there was nearly a complete abandonment of the
distinction between legal and illegal wars and war was generally justified if they were fought for
the protection or defense of certain vital interests.71
D. INTERVENTIONS IN THE 19TH AND EARLY 20TH CENTURIES
Based on the strict application of the sovereignty of nation-states, the 19th century was
characterized by an unlimited right of war and the recognition of conquests.72 It was only the
emergence of the balance-of-power system in the 19th century curtailed wars to a very great
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extent. The expense, destructiveness and long duration of wars, coupled with the risks of defeat,
meant that wars were not worth fighting unless the stakes involved were very high.73
In 1860, Philimore wrote that: “War is the exercise of the international right of action, to
which, from the nature of the thing and the absence of any common superior tribunal, nations are
compelled to have recourse, in order to assert and vindicate their rights.”74
However, war was only regarded as a measure of last, and was to be resorted to only
when all peaceful means to the resolution of a conflict failed. In 1878, the World Peace
Conference in Paris declared by a resolution that: “la guerre offensive est un brigandige”.75
State practice, however, did not immediately reflect the changes in the world’s attitude to
wars. Instead, what evolved was a doctrine of a right to ‘self-preservation’ of the nation-state, as
a ‘Droit absolut des Etats’.76 Out of this doctrine evolved a practice of lesser measures of armed
force, which did not amount to ‘war’, such as ‘self-defense’,77 ‘reprisal’ and ‘pacific blockade’.78
This practice of lesser measures of force eventually developed to include interventions
justified on humanitarian grounds. This started with the invasion of Greece by some western
powers in 1827 to protect Greek Christians from persecution by the occupying Turks. The Treaty
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of London, which formally authorized the intervention, stated that it was undertaken ‘by
sentiments of humanity’.79
Another example worthy of mention is the French invasion of Syria under the Ottoman
Empire in 1860, to rescue severely persecuted Christians. The invasion was sanctioned by some
leading European states at the Conference of Paris in the same year.80 Though the French troops
stayed on and later became ‘an occupational force’, this instance is widely accepted as a case of
humanitarian intervention.81
Similarly, Russia intervened in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria in 1877, which was
also under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. The treatment meted out to Christians in these areas
was so cruel that one British investigator described it as ‘the most heinous crimes that had
stained the history of the century’.82 The intervention was allegedly carried out on humanitarian
grounds.
The invasion of Cuba by the United States in 1898 has also been cited as a case of
humanitarian intervention.83 In an address to the US Congress, President McKinley said that the
purpose of the intervention was ‘in the name of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities,
bloodshed, starvation and horrible miseries now existing there’.84
Some leading scholars and writers on international law have doubted the ‘genuineness’ of
these interventions. These scholars, led by Brownlie, argue that these interventions were not
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carried out solely on humanitarian grounds but that power politics between Western and
European states also played a role. Subsequently, there has been no clear case of humanitarian
intervention.85 With regards to the Ottoman Empire, Fenwick states that the ‘alleged
humanitarian motives were… influenced or affected by the political interests of the intervening
state’.86 It is also argued that some of the interventions, like those in Syria and Greece were
treaty based and not carried out unilaterally.87
Nevertheless, the language used by the intervening states clearly indicates some sort of
‘opinio juris’ regarding the right of humanitarian intervention. Even if other considerations were
also involved the states were arguably “attaching primacy to that principle [of humanitarian
intervention] over their treaty rights as the justification for intervention.”88 The states themselves
were clear in their conviction that humanitarian intervention was a lawful measure of ‘lesser
armed force’ derived from customary international law.
Again, the argument that treaties authorized the interventions does not detract from the
fact that the states involved believed that they were entitled by customary law to intervene for
humanitarian purposes because these treaties were not universally adopted. They could hardly
therefore create a right to unilateral intervention imposable against the target state.
In the early 20th century, the desire to intervene for humanitarian purposes subsided and
the unilateral use of force was largely considered illegal. The creation of the League of Nations
gave institutional guarantees to basic rights and the League was given the power to authorize the
collective use of force. The League of Nation’s Covenant, signed in 1919, sought to restrain
countries from going to wars but did not abolish wars altogether. Article 12 (1) provided thus:
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The members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute
likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial
settlement or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until
three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report by
the Council.89
The attempts in the 1920’s to transform the Covenant’s partial prohibition of war to a
total ban of war culminated in the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Kellogg-Briand
Pact or the Pact of Paris) which was signed in 1928, which declared in article 1 that: “The High
Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument
of national policy in their relations with one another”.90
The League and the Kellog-Briand Pact, however, could not prevent wars as totalitarian
aggression by Germany and Italy in the early 1930’s led to World War II.
E. CONCLUSION – STATUSQUO OF UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
BEFORE THE INCEPTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
The discussion above suggests that state sovereignty has co-existed with the principle of
unilateral humanitarian intervention since the inception of the state system.91 A learned author, in
1955, wrote as follows:
[T]here is a substantial body of opinion and practice in support of the view that there are
limits to that discretion and that when a State renders itself guilty of cruelties against and
persecution of its nationals in such a way as t deny their fundamental human rights and to
shock the conscience of mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity is legally
permissible.92
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However, a minority of writers dismissed the existence of such a customary right. The
issue then turns on interpretation of the available state practice, which is perhaps influenced by a
writer’s conviction as to whether humanitarian intervention should be lawful or not.
I submit however that in my view the correct position is that unilateral humanitarian
intervention was legal under customary law prior to the establishment of the UN. This view is
aptly supported by Fonteyne, namely that: “While divergences certainly existed as to the
circumstances in which resort could be had to the institution of humanitarian intervention …the
principle itself was widely, if not unanimously, accepted as an integral part of customary
international law.”93
It is therefore arguable that the customary right of unilateral humanitarian intervention
existed as of the time of World War II.
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CHAPTER 3
TREATY LAW – UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
The basic regime in international law governing the use of force is that established under
the United Nations Charter (UN Charter). The starting point on any discussion about the legality
or otherwise of the use of force in international law is article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Article 2(4)
provides: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the objectives of Purposes of the United Nations.”94
There are only two express exceptions to the rule stated above in the UN Charter. The
first is that stated by article 51 of the UN Charter that provides the right of states to use force in
self-defense to an armed attack.95 Chapter VII of the Charter also provides one express exception
to the non-intervention principle by granting powers to the Security Council to use force against
any member state if the Security Council believes other measures, not involving the use of force,
is not or would not be adequate in the maintenance or restoration of international peace and
security.96
The ban on the use of force in article 2(4) is complemented by article 2(7) of the Charter
that prohibits the United Nations itself from intervening in matters that are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state.97 The central issue in this comment is whether in the light of
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articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter, there exists the right of humanitarian intervention under
the Charter regime itself, looking at the language used in the articles listed above.
Collective intervention authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the
Charter is obviously valid and is not one of the issues being examined in this comment. The issue
is whether individual or collective humanitarian intervention that is not authorized by the
Security Council is legal under the Charter.
The Charter itself highlights the tension between the sovereignty, independence, and
equality of individual states, on one hand, and the need collectively by the international
community to ensure peace and security on the other.98
The majority of international law scholars are of the view that humanitarian intervention
is not legal under the U. N. Charter. 99 These scholars argue basically that article 2(4) cannot be
interpreted in any way that will allow humanitarian intervention and that as the provisions of the
Charter stands now; humanitarian intervention is illegal. Others even go to the extent of holding
that the principle of non-intervention has raised to the status of ius cogens – a peremptory norm
of general application for which no derogation is permitted.100 Other scholars, albeit in the
minority, but admittedly of a growing number argue to the contrary, holding that humanitarian
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intervention is legal under the Charter as one of the primary purposes of the Charter is the
promotion of human rights.101
I. TEXTUAL ARGUMENTS
A. CLASSICISTS GOOD FAITH VIEW
Classicists believe there is no persuasive ground for claiming that a right of humanitarian
intervention exists under the UN Charter. First, they assert that there are only two exceptions to
the norm prohibiting the use of force in international relations as established by the Charter,
namely, that of an assertion of self defense or collective self defense and a Security Council
authorization.102 The provisions of article 2 (4) read together with article 2 (7), combined with
General Assembly resolution 2131103 totally abolishes the threat or use of force in international
relations except with regards to the two exceptions noted above. Therefore, classicists conclude
that the Charter prohibits the use of force for humanitarian purposes.
Second, the classicists note that the framers of the U.N. Charter expressly and explicitly
provided for two exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force.104 The first exception
permits the use of force in self-defense against armed attack105 whilst the second permits an
action by the Security Council as an enforcement measure in the performance of its duty of
maintaining or restoring world peace.106 Gordon argues in support of the above assertion that if
the framers of the Charter wanted to permit the use of force for humanitarian purposes as a third
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exception to the prohibition on use of force, they would have done so expressly.107 However, the
term “humanitarian intervention” cannot be found anywhere in the text of the Charter, indicating
clearly that there is no right to use force for humanitarian purposes.108
Third, classicists argue against the use of force for humanitarian reasons by relying on
two General Assembly resolutions. The first is General Assembly resolution 2625 (U. N. G.A.
Res. 2625 (XXV) on the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter provides that “No state
or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the
internal or external affairs of another state.” 109
Second, they rely on a 1974 resolution of the General Assembly. The General Assembly
defined “aggression” as “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of another state…” stated categorically “no justification of
whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification
for aggression.”110 Scholars who are not in favor of the legality of humanitarian intervention
argue that the 1970 resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations was an affirmation
of the sacredness of the principle of non-intervention and its primacy in international relations.111
Fourth, classicists base their argument against the right to use force for humanitarian
purposes on the provisions of the Charter with regard to the use of force in self-defense.
Classicists claim that the founders of the Charter were so fearful and skeptical about the
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unilateral use of force that they even limited the right to self-defense.112 This claim is premised
on the fact that if an action is taken in self-defense, the state must inform the Security Council
immediately.113 Once the Security Council takes measures with respect to that attack, the right of
self-defense becomes extinguished.114 It follows that the right to use force is severely
circumscribed if it is limited even in cases of self-defense, which is accepted as a very legitimate
case for the use of force. Therefore, it is prudent to prohibit any use of force that is not expressly
provided for by the Charter.
Finally, classicists argue that the drafters of the Charter clearly intended the phrase
“against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” to buttress, rather than
restrict, the ban on the use of force in international relations.”115 Therefore, humanitarian
intervention is clearly illegal under the Charter regime.
B. PROPONENTS (REALISTS) GOOD FAITH VIEW
Realists on the other hand argue that the inception of the United Nations neither
extinguished nor undermined the customary law rule of humanitarian intervention. Rather, the
Charter extended and emphasized on the right of humanitarian intervention.116
Realists find support for their position with articles of the Charter, which scholars on the
other side of the divide rely on. First, they argue that the prohibition of the use of force in Article
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2(4) of the UN Charter is not total in the sense that “it forbids only the use of force when it is
directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”117
According to D’Amato, Territorial Integrity means, “preventing the permanent loss of a
portion of one’s territory”.118 Humanitarian intervention ‘properly’ so called will not even result
in a loss of a nations sovereignty, albeit temporarily.119 Again, the concept of political
independence means a state’s independence must not be compromised.120 It is submitted that
humanitarian interventions will not have any effect on a nation’s independence, and therefore
does not violates a nation’s political independence.121
Teson, a strong advocate of the legality of humanitarian intervention, sums up the above
views regarding the effect of humanitarian intervention on the political independence and
territorial integrity of the target state. He stated that the use of force is prohibited: (a) when it
impairs the territorial integrity of the target state; (b) when it affects its political independence; or
(c) when it is otherwise against the purposes of the United Nations.”122
He argues further that a genuine humanitarian intervention neither impairs the territorial
integrity of the target state nor results in political subjugation.123 Therefore, in Teson’s opinion, a
critical look at the ordinary meaning of the words used in article 2(4) and as understood by the
drafters of the Charter, tests (a) and (b) of his three-prong tests are satisfied.124 The issue then is
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whether humanitarian intervention will survive the “purpose” test.125 Since the promotion of
justice and human rights is one of the purposes of the United Nations, then humanitarian
intervention is legal under the Charter regime.
Realists also argue that there is no doubt that the promotion of human rights is an
important purpose of the United Nations Charter. Article 1(3) of the United Nations Charter
states that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to achieve international cooperation…in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Teson states that a purposive reading of article
2(4), a reading that is dictated by the wording of the provision itself, indicates that the use of
force to overthrow regimes that do not respect fundamental human rights cannot be included in
the blanket prohibition of the provision in article 2(4).126 He contends further that the use of
force to curtail serious human rights violations, far from being “contrary to the purposes” of the
United Nations Charter, serves one of its main purposes.127
Finally, it follows logically that if all uses of force with the exception of those expressly
stated in the Charter were illegal, then the qualifying clauses to article 2 (4) becomes redundant.
In other to give effect to the qualifying clauses in article 2 (4) therefore, one has to look at other
parts of the Charter. Since the preamble to the Charter lists the promotion of human rights as one
of its purposes, then humanitarian intervention is not inconsistent with the Charter.128
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C. SUMMARY OF THE TEXTUAL ARGUMENTS
Though both classicists and realists present credible arguments as to the legality of
unilateral humanitarian intervention, the classicist position is generally accepted.129 However, it
is not very clear whether unilateral humanitarian intervention is permitted under the UN Charter
as the wording of Article 2(4) leaves much to be desired. Generally, the mentioning of something
means the exclusion of all that is not mentioned. This will support the case of the classicist that
the drafters could have specifically provided for humanitarian intervention the same way it
provided for self-defense.
However, it is also true that the acceptance of the reasoning above leaves some words in
Article 2(4) redundant. Generally, if a provision can be interpreted reasonably without leaving
any words redundant, that interpretation is preferable to the interpretation that leaves some words
redundant. This obviously supports the case of the realist.
II. INTENT ARGUMENTS
A. CLASSICISTS VIEW OF INTENT
Classicists argue that the most paramount of values sought to be protected under the
Charter regime is that of non-intervention, which the framers believed would culminate in world
peace.130 This desire for peace makes the prohibition on the use of force in international disputes
one of the most fundamental goals of the United Nations.131 Thus, under the Charter, the use of
force is not legitimized simply because it is in the interest of justice. The Charter chose peace
over justice in the event of a conflict between these two important goals of the United Nations.
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Force is therefore forbidden as a means of enforcing rules of international law or treaties.132
Cassese for instance categorically states that “any time that conflict or tension arises between
two or more of these values; peace must always constitute the ultimate and prevailing factor”.133
Some Classicists also argue that a look at some of the language debated in the
formulation of the Charter. For instance, it is said that one of the proposals called for the
“protection of human rights,” instead of the “promotion of human rights” which was eventually
put in the text of the Charter.134 It is submitted that the use of the word “protect” would allow for
a more rigorous defense of human rights as compared to the relatively meek “promote” which
was eventually accepted by the founders of the Charter.135
The proposal to use the word “protect” was not accepted because “it would raise hopes
beyond what the United Nations could successfully accomplish.”136 It is submitted that the use of
“promote” meant that the founders of the Charter expressed a right that cannot be enforced by
going as far as the use of force. Thus, many ratifying nations recognized the insufficiency of the
articles meant to ensure that human rights were upheld and accordingly hoped to pass a Bill of
Rights to help enforce the protection of human rights.137
B. REALISTS VIEW OF INTENT
Realists argue forcefully that the human rights provisions in the Charter were not put
there accidentally or carelessly but that nations felt the need to ensure that all enjoyed
fundamental human rights. In His leading work on the human rights provisions of the Charter,
Lauterpacht insists that the human rights provisions were adopted only after an extensive
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discussion, making it a legal duty for nations to respect and observe.138 He recognized that the
Charter drafters could have used a much stronger word such as “respect” instead of “promote”
but insisted that such an omission was of little practical importance:
[I]t would be out of keeping with the spirit of the Charter and, probably with the accepted
canons of interpretation of treaties, to attach decisive importance to that omission (of the
word “respect”). It would be otiose to the point of pedantry for the draftsmen of the
Charter to incorporate an explicit provision of this nature in a document in which the
principle of respect for and observance of human rights… is one of the main pillars of the
structure of the Organization…139
Adding to the strength of the above argument is the fact that the original proposal of the
U.N., prepared by the great powers after World War II contained just one general provision with
respect to human rights. However, non-governmental organizations and the smaller states were
determined and ensured that the ratified version contained substantial provisions on human
rights.140 Logically, it took a lot of efforts and emphasis in getting these human rights provisions
included in the ratified version considering the fact that the great powers did not consider it very
important initially.
Again, it is only logical to conclude that human rights violations are matters of
international concern and not solely matters of domestic concern.141 Concluding that human
rights are solely matters of domestic concern would nullify many international agreements by
rendering them ultra vires. If the argument that human rights are only matters of domestic
concern were upheld, then every government would be guilty of interfering in the domestic
affairs of another nation. This is predicated on the premise that nearly all nations are now subject
to some international human rights agreement which obliges them to promote and protect the
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human rights of their inhabitants. Efforts to ensure compliance with their treaty obligations
cannot be said to be improper interference in domestic affairs.142
Again, pro-interventionists argue that there is a necessary link between the maintenance
of peace and respect for human rights.143 Human rights would be of international concern as soon
as it was foreseeable that they presented a threat to the peace.144 The UN Charter provides the
Security Council the authority to intervene when the peace is breached,145 it is argued that
serious human rights abuses and deprivations, should give rise to an analogous permission. This
assumption may provide another reason to intervene in cases where human rights deprivations
have or is threatened to result in a breach of international peace.146 Humanitarian intervention is
therefore not inconsistent with the provisions of the UN Charter.
C. SUMMARY OF THE INTENT ARGUMENTS
The intent arguments posited by both realist and classicist are tenable. It is abundantly
clear that the drafters of the UN Charter intended to halt both aggression and violations of human
rights.147 It is however not clear whether they intended to sacrifice one value for the other in case
of conflict. As D’Amato has observed, it is very difficult to determine the intent of a large group
of people as the framers of the UN Charter.148
What makes classicists intent arguments an intriguing one is the fact that a prohibition on
unilateral use of force for human rights amounts to a tacit acceptance of the non-existence of
human rights. This flows from the fact that denying force to curtail human rights violations when
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all other methods have proved futile only means those human rights are devoid of remedy. But as
rightly pointed out by Franck and Rodley, a right without a remedy logically implies the nonexistence of that the right.149
III. POLICY ARGUMENTS
To the extent the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention is not clear from the
provisions of the UN Charter, both realist and classicist often tend to rely on policy reasons to
support their respective claims. The realists contend that the inability of the SC to perform its
role effectively allows states to retain a residual right to intervene unilaterally when the need
arises. The classicists on the other hand rely on the possibility of abuse if unilateral humanitarian
intervention is permitted.
A. CLASSICISTS ‘ABUSE’ ARGUMENT AND REALISTS RESPONSE
Classicists argue that in any human endeavor there is the possibility of abuse and
therefore it will be too dangerous to allow a right of humanitarian intervention.150 The possibility
of abuse was highlighted by the ICJ when it observed that an “alleged right of intervention as the
manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and
as such cannot … find a place in international law.151
Classicists contend that humanitarian intervention is just a way of allowing the strong to
intervene in weaker states to promote their own agenda since it is unrealistic to imagine that
potential interveners would disregard any advantages they may gain and act solely for
humanitarian reasons.152
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Realists have responded to the possibility of abuse with two strong counter- arguments.
First, they assert that the UN must deal with the underlying problem and not eradicate the
problem. An accurate analogy is offered using police officers and crime in the United States. The
fact that the police had on occasion abused their powers while trying to prevent crime does not
mean the United States government should eliminate the police. Therefore, the best way out is to
eliminate the problem of human rights violations and not humanitarian intervention.153
Second, the absolute prohibition of unilateral humanitarian intervention is premised on
the argument that the utility that will be derived from prohibition of the rule will be better than
the utility to be gained if the rule is allowed. However, this will not always be true as in some
circumstance; it will be obvious that allowing for humanitarian intervention would be better than
denying it.154
B. REALISTS ‘FAILURE OF THE UN’ ARGUMENT AND CLASSICISTS RESPONSE
Realists argue that even if the UN Charter sought to prohibit the unilateral use of force
for humanitarian purposes, states retain a residual right because of the ineffectiveness of the
Security Council to act in the face of gross violations of human rights. Jessup contends that “[i]t
would seem that the only possible measures under the Security Council for individual measures
by a single state would be the inability of the international organization to act with the speed
requisite to preserve life”.155
Realists acknowledge that the right to use force unilaterally is retained by states only
because the UN system has failed to function the way it was set up to. A proper functioning of
the world body would obviate any need for the unilateral use of force.156 However, the Charter
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system never functioned the way the drafters intended it to. During the Cold War, the Security
Council was paralyzed as the permanent members of the Security Council frequently used their
veto power to ensure that there was never a consensus within that body.157
It is submitted that member states of the UN surrendered their customary right to use
force for on the condition of creating an effective collective security and enforcement machinery
by the UN. Since the UN has failed in its role, especially because of the excessive use of the veto
by the permanent members of the Security Council, the executive arm of the UN, members are
partially relieved of their obligation not to use force unilaterally.158
There are numerous examples of situations where the need for UN action was obviously
needed in the face of massive human rights abuses but the UN failed to intervene. Examples
include the Indonesian government’s killing of hundreds of political nonconformists in the mid1960’s, the Rwandan genocide which witnessed the slaughter of hundreds of thousands Tutsis,
the decimation of thousands of Hutus in Burundi, the Southern Sudanese government’s massacre
of secessionist blacks and the killing of almost one million Ibos at the hands of the Nigerian
government.159
In the face of no assistance from the UN when atrocities are going on, realists contend
that it is in the best interest of the world for society to retain some measure of unilateral use of
force.
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The fact that the UN system has failed to function the way it was set up is not in dispute.
Subsequently, classicists have found it difficult to offer constructive responses to this realists’
argument.
IV. CONCLUSION: STATUS OF UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
UNDER THE UN CHARTER.
The legality of unilateral humanitarian under the UN Charter can be ascertained by
applying the rules on treaty interpretation as stated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. The basic principle of interpretation of treaties as stated in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties posits that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning of the words of the treaty in their context, having regard to the object and
purpose of the treaty.160 It says that the context for the purpose of interpreting a treaty shall
comprise the text of the treaty, its preamble and annexes.161
A careful reading of article 2(4), giving the words their ordinary meaning in their context
and in the light of its object and purposes does not resolve the impasse. A look at the context of
the UN Charter does not help in the determination of the legality of humanitarian intervention
under the Charter. As stated earlier, both views on the interpretation of Article 2(4) are
tenable.162
An inquiry into the UN Charter’s preamble, an important part of the context of the treaty,
provides no answer as to the legality or otherwise of humanitarian intervention under the Charter
regime. The preamble states among other things the determination on the part of the members to
“save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” However, it urges states to put into place
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a system under which “justice” can be maintained.163 This may include using force to overthrow
regimes that persistently deny fundamental human rights to their own citizens. Thus, the two
dictates of the preamble as listed above are in direct conflict with each other, one supporting the
legality of humanitarian intervention and the other not. The object and purpose of the UN
Charter is of little help as the competing values, peace and justice are both part of the purposes of
the UN.164
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, where the ordinary meaning
of a provision in a treaty is ambiguous, recourse may be had to the supplementary means of
interpretation.165 It states that the supplementary means of interpretation includes the preparatory
work of the treaty (travaux preparatoires) and the circumstances of its conclusion.166
The travaux preparatoires of the Charter itself does not help much in the determination of
the true meaning of Article 2 (4) of the Charter, as there is little documentary evidence of the
content of the travaux preparatoires of the Charter. Scholastic opinion is also not unanimous on
the issue; whilst some contend that the travaux preparatoires is of little assistance in the search of
the meaning of Article 2(4), others have contrasting accounts of the content of the travaux
preparatoires.
According to Brownlie, an examination of the travaux preparatoires does not indicate
whether the framers intended to maintain the customary exceptions to the use of force, including
humanitarian intervention.167 Professor Lillich however observed that Brownlie’s own account is
not supportive of his conclusion that the final clause of Article 2(4) does not qualify the
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prohibition.168 It is posited that a Norwegian suggestion to omit the qualifying clause in Article
2(4) was declined in San Francisco.169
Despite the difficulty in accessing the legality of humanitarian intervention under the UN
Charter, it is the view of the present author that humanitarian intervention is not permissible
under the Charter regime. The arguments by the classicists are more persuasive legally although
as a policy matter, the arguments put forward by the realists are more appealing.
A look at other legal instruments signed in the years immediately preceding the signing
of the UN Charter leaves me in no doubt that the use of force was generally prohibited at the
time. For instance, the Pact of the Arab League provided that “recourse to force for the
settlement of disputes arising between two or more member states of the League is
prohibited”.170 Similarly, it is significant to note that the Charter of the Organization of American
States (Bogotá Charter) signed just one year after the Janeiro Treaty contained certain provisions
that extensively prohibited the use of force in international relations.171 Almost all of these
treaties made specific reference to the UN Charter.
A considerable number of agreements, in addition to the ones stated above, essentially
prohibited the use of force in international relations.172 A critical appraisal of the arguments of
both classicists and realists, considered together with all the treaties that were entered into in the
years immediately preceding the coming into force of the UN Charter, indicate that the UN
Charter essentially sought to prohibit the unilateral use of force save in the circumstances
expressly stated.
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CHAPTER 4
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
I. DEFINITION
Customs in international law can generally be defined as rules developed by the practice
of states, which rules the states concerned follow because they believe there is a rule of law
requiring them to behave as such. Rebecca Wallace defines it as “… a practice followed by those
concerned because they feel legally obliged to behave in such a way”.173 Thus, for there to exist
a rule of customary international law, there must be a practice that is followed by the generality
of states in the belief that there is a rule of law requiring such practice.
It is important to distinguish custom from other rules that states may follow not out of
any feeling of a legal obligation, such as behavior undertaken out of courtesy, friendship or
convenience. The difference between customs and these other norms is the fact that custom is
derived from two elements: (i) a material element (state practice) and (ii) a psychological
element (opinio juris).174 The material element is derived from the practice and behavior of states
whereas the psychological element is the subjective conviction held by states that the behavior is
question is necessitated by a rule of law and not discretionary.175
II. ELEMENTS OF CUSTOM
As indicated above, the two elements of customary rules of international law are state
practice and opinio juris.
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A. STATE PRACTICE AND ITS CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS
It is essential to determine what constitute state practice as it has been referred to
appropriately as the raw material of customary law.176 In the ascertainment of state practice, we
have to look at “what states do in their relations with one another”177 or as stated by Professor
McDougal, the “process of continuous interaction, of continuous demand and response”.178 State
practice therefore includes any act, articulation or other behavior of a state that discloses the
state’s conscious attitude with respect to its recognition of a rule of customary international
law.179
The International Law Commission in 1950 listed the following as forms of “Evidence of
Customary International Law”: [T]reaties, decisions of national and international courts, national
legislation, diplomatic correspondence, opinions of national legal advisers, practice of
international organizations.180
Thus, state practice may include diplomatic correspondence, general declarations of
foreign or legal policy181, opinion of national legal advisers in domestic and international fora.
Judge Ammoun in his separate opinion in the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company
Case182 considered the importance of such statements when he stated that, with respect: “to
return to State practice as manifested within international organisations and conferences, it
cannot denied, with regard to the resolutions which emerge therefrom, or better, with regard to
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the votes expressed therein in the name of States, that these amount to precedents contributing to
the formation of custom”.183
Despite the acceptance of these indicators of state practice, the importance of overt state
practice in the formation of custom should not be discounted.184 This was emphasized by the ICJ
in the Continental Shelf Case (Libya v. Malta)185 when the Court stated: “It is of course
axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the
actual practice and opinio juris of states even though multilateral conventions may have an
important role to play in defining and recording rules, deriving from custom or indeed in
developing them”.186
State practice can be determined from the extent of a particular practice as well as the
duration of the practice.
1. Extent of Practice
It is essential for the formation and existence of a customary rule that there exists general
State practice. Article 38 of the ICJ statute itself mentions “general practice”. The ICJ held in the
Asylum Case187 that for state practice to amount to law, it had to be in accordance with a
“constant and uniform usage” practiced by the states in question.188
Similarly, the ICJ emphasized the importance of an extensive practice by the generality
of states in the Fisheries Case (UK v. Norway) when it stated that:
[A]lthough the ten-mile rule has been adopted by certain States both in their national law
and in their treaties and conventions, and although certain arbitral decisions have applied
it as between these States, other States have adopted a different limit. Consequently, the
ten-mile rule has not acquired the authority of a general rule of law.189
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The ICJ again gave an insight into the extent of practice needed to form a rule of
customary international law in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. The Court stated that “…,
State practice, including that of states whose interests are specifically affected, should have been
both extensive and virtually uniform….”190
The locus classicus of the extent of practice required for the formation of a rule of
customary international law can be found in the judgment of the ICJ in the Asylum Case where it
stated that:
The party which relies on a custom … must prove that this custom is established in such
a manner that it has become binding on the other party … that the rule invoked … is in
accordance with a constant and uniform usage practiced by the States in question, and
that this usage is the expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a
duty incumbent on the territorial State. This follows from Article 38 of the Statute of the
Court, which refers to international custom ‘as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law’. The facts brought to the knowledge of the Court discloses so much uncertainty and
contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic asylum
and in the official views expressed on different occasions; there has been so much
inconsistency in the rapid succession of conventions on asylum, ratified by some States
and rejected by others, and the practice has been so much influenced by considerations of
political expediency in the various cases, that it is not possible to discern in all of this any
constant and uniform usage, accepted as law ….191
The above decisions clearly indicate that for the existence of a rule of customary law,
there must be an extensive practice by the generality of states. No rule may be accepted as a rule
of customary law without meeting the criteria of extensive practice. Whilst it is not essential for
there to be universal practice, practice should be representative,192 of at least the major political
and socio-economic systems.193
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However, a single act may lead to the establishment of a rule of customary law if it is
accompanied by a widespread support for the action. O’Connell succinctly stated this when she
stated that the instances in which one act results in the establishment of a rule of customary rule
are rare. She noted “[w]hatever the arguments, international legal rules are not easily changed.
One act not in conformity with the rules does not eliminate a legal regime, unless one finds
overwhelming support for that change.”194
2. Duration
Generally, there is no specific time limit that is required for the emergence of a rule of
customary law.195 Brownlie states that provided the consistency and generality of a practice is
established, no particular duration is required.196 The passage of only a short time is not itself a
bar to the formation of a rule of customary law.197 The ICJ emphasized the relative less
importance of time if other conditions are satisfied in the formation of custom in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases198 when it stated thus:
… Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a
bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law … an indispensable
requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it might be, State
practice … should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the
provision invoked; - and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a
general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.199
The length of time required for the formation of a rule of customary international law will
therefore depend on other factors pertinent to the alleged rule.200
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B. OPINIO JURIS SIVE NECESSITATIS (OPINIO JURIS)
This is the psychological element that draws the distinction between conduct and
behavior which states enter undertake because they feel there is a rule of law requiring it and
conduct or behavior which may be undertaken by states out of political expediency, courtesy or
other reasons.201 Hudson posited that the “practice is required by, or consistent with, prevailing
international law”.202
The practice of the ICJ has revealed that in some cases the Court is willing to assume the
existence of an opinio juris based on the availability of state practice, or a consensus in the
literature, or the previous determination of the Court or other international tribunals.203 In other
cases, however, the Court has taken a different approach by calling for a more positive evidence
of the existence of opinio juris.204
The main problem with opinio juris is one of proof as it is frequently difficult to
determine when the transformation has taken place to make a practice a rule of law.205 Generally
speaking, it is the party alleging the existence of custom that must prove its existence for the
other party to be bound by that rule.206
A number of decisions of the ICJ brought to the fore the important role of opinio juris in
the customary law making process. The first authoritative statement on the requirement of opinio
juris in the formation of rules of customary international law was made by the Permanent Court
of International Justice (PCIJ), the predecessor of the ICJ in the celebrated case of the S.S.
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Lotus.207 In that case, France identified several instances where the flag state of a victim of a
collision on the High Seas had failed to institute criminal prosecution against the alleged
offender(s). The Court nevertheless failed to find the existence of a rule of customary
international law requiring such practice. The Court said:
Even if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found among the reported cases were
sufficient to prove in point of fact the circumstances alleged by the Agent of the French
Government, it would merely show that States had often, in practice, abstained from
instituting criminal proceedings, and not that they recognized themselves as being
obliged to do so; for only if such abstention were based on their being conscious of a duty
to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international custom. The alleged fact does
not allow one to infer that States have been conscious of having such a duty; on the other
hand … there are other circumstances calculated to show that the contrary is true.208
Similarly, the ICJ maintained in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases that, although the
principle of equidistance was employed in the delimitation of the continental shelf cases between
adjacent states, there was no evidence to prove that “… they so acted because they felt legally
compelled to draw them in this way by reason of a rule of customary international law obliging
them to do so – especially considering that they might have been motivated by other factors”.209
The ICJ summed up the requirements of customary international law, emphasizing the
importance of both state practice and opinio juris in the Case of Nicaragua v. United States
(Merits)210 where the Court noted as follows:
In considering the instances of the conduct above described, the Court has to emphasize
that, as was observed in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, for a new customary rule
to be formed, not only must the acts concerned ‘amount to a settled practice’, but they
must be accompanied by the opinio juris sive necessitates. Either the States taking such
action or other States in a position to react to it, must have behaved so that their conduct
is ‘evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule
of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e. the existence of a subjective element, is
implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis’.211
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Thus, for the formation and existence of rules of customary international law, both the
state practice and the opinio juris must exist simultaneously. If this criterion is not met, there can
be no rules of customary international law as the decisions of the ICJ have made clear.
C. STATE PRACTICE AFTER 1945
1. Interventions During the Cold War, 1945-1989
The period after World War II was characterized by distrust and enmity, ‘the Cold War’,
between the Western and the Sino-Soviet countries and their allies. The two sides refused to cooperate on the international arena, and often supported different sides of a conflict merely in
defiance of each other.212
This had the direct consequence of rendering the Security Council virtually ineffective.
Whenever there was a humanitarian crisis that demanded that the Security Council take action,
the Security Council could not as one of the permanent members of the Security Council always
exercised the right to veto the decision of the Security Council. Thus, the UN could not send
forces to Uganda, Kampuchea when human catastrophes were being perpetrated.
(a) Selection of Cases
Most interventions during the ‘Cold War’ were basically for ideological purposes. As a
result, I would discuss two interventions that nothing to do with the ‘super powers’ and were
generally accepted as humanitarian, even if the intervening states were believed to have some
other motives for intervening.
(i) India in East Bengal (Bangladesh), 1971
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India gained independence from Great Britain in 1947. Two separate nations came into
existence with the withdrawal of Great Britain from the Indian peninsula, namely India and
Pakistan.213 Pakistan was a nation divided geographically and ethnically into two entities, West
Pakistan and East Pakistan (also known as West and East Bengal).214 These two communities
had very different characteristics215 and only enmity for India and a shared religion united
them.216
By 1970, the lesser populated West Pakistanis had gained political and economic control
of East Pakistan, creating a condition of serious unrest in the East.217 General elections were held
in December 1990. The Awami League, an opposition party in East Pakistan won majority of the
seats in the National Assembly and demanded more autonomy for the East.218 This did not go
down well with the central government and President Yahya Khan decided to postpone the
National assembly indefinitely.219 The existing crisis in East Pakistan was then aggravated.
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Awami League leader, issued a “Declaration of Emancipation” on
March 23, 1971.220
On March 25, 1971, the West Pakistani army struck East Pakistan and started an
indiscriminate killing of unarmed civilians, Bengalis and Hindus, burning of homes and other
property.221 The West Pakistani army killed an estimated one million people during its campaign,
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particularly the minority Hindu population.222 An estimated ten million people fled to India as a
result of the massacres, causing the country tremendous hardship.223
Border incidents began to occur and the relationship between India and Pakistan became
tense. On December 3, 1971, India attacked Pakistan and formally recognized an independent
state of Bangladesh on December 6, 1971. India defeated the West Pakistani army and the war
lasted twelve days.224 India initially justified the intervention on humanitarian reasons, and the
Indian representative to the United Nations declared thus: “we have … absolutely nothing but the
purest of motives and the purest intentions: to rescue the people of East Bengal from what they
are suffering.”225 However, this ‘humanitarian’ rationale was later changed to self-defense as
India claimed Pakistan had attacked it during the border skirmishes between the two nations.226
It has been argued that India’s intervention was not a legitimate case of humanitarian
intervention and therefore does not support the legality of humanitarian intervention. First, it is
claimed that there is little doubt about the fact that India had more selfish motives for intervening
rather than humanitarian. It is claimed that the splitting up of Pakistan, a powerful rival,
enhanced India’s own security.227 However, this reason in itself does not detract from it being a
case of humanitarian intervention and supporting the existence of the rule because a valid
humanitarian intervention need not be motivated solely by human rights concern since it is
difficult, if not impossible, to determine all the motives of state action.228

222

Douglas Eisner, Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 11 B. U. Int’l L. J. 195, 202 (1993).
Natolino Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on the Grounds of
Humanity 95 (1985).
224
Fernando Teson, Humanitarian Intervention 204 (2nd ed. 1997).
225
U. N. Doc. S/PV. 1606 (1971). Quoted in T. M. Franck and N. S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of
Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 Am. J. Int’l L. 275, 276 (1973).
226
N. J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society 62 (Oxford University Press,
2000).
227
Douglas Eisner, Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era, 11 B. U. Int’l L. 195, 202 (1993).
228
Id.
223

51
India’s action drew sharp criticisms from the U.N. In a vote in the General Assembly on
the lawfulness of India’s action, a massive one-hundred and four nations declared India’s action
an unlawful violation of sovereignty229 and called on India to withdraw its troops from East
Pakistan.230
Again, it has been argued that the fact that India changed its justification from
‘humanitarian’ to self-defense means that India acknowledged that humanitarian
intervention was not legal. I agree with Akehurst’s argument that India’s change of mind
signaled their ‘realization that humanitarian intervention was not a sufficient justification for the
use of force’.231 However, Teson argues that the important point is not whether changed its
justification or not, but whether a look at the whole situation depicts one that warranted foreign
intervention on grounds of humanity. Bazyler claims that India’s “course of action in the
Bangladesh situation probably constitutes the clearest case of forceful individual humanitarian
intervention in this century,” and argues that the intervention supports the doctrine.232 It must be
noted that an act may be illegal at the time it is done but may mark the beginning of a new rule of
customary international law and therefore the Indian intervention is significant, whichever way
one looks at it. I support the view that at the time India intervened in Pakistan they believed that
humanitarian intervention was not legal and that is why they changed their justification from one
of ‘humanitarian’ to self-defense.
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(ii) Tanzania in Uganda, 1979
The Idi Amin government of Uganda committed widespread atrocities and massive
human rights violations against its own citizens during its reign from 1971 to 1979.233 The
government of Uganda executed approximately three-hundred thousand people during this
period.234 Evidence of public executions, rape and torture was discovered by the Amnesty
International which subsequently characterized the regime’s human rights as atrocious.235
During this period, border skirmishes between Uganda and its neighbor, Tanzania,
increased hostilities between the two countries. In October 1978, Ugandan troops invaded
Tanzanian territory and occupied the Kagera salient, an area located between the UgandaTanzania border and the Kagera River.236 Amin subsequently declared the annexation of the
territory north of the Kagera salient on November 1.237 Tanzania’s President, Nyerere,
considered the annexation tantamount to war and vowed to act against vigorously against the
Ugandan troops.238
On November 15, 1979, Tanzania launched an offensive against Uganda, operating from
the Southern Bank of the Kagera River.239 The Ugandans happily welcomed the Tanzanian
troops, Amin threatened in a broadcast to punish all who supported the enemy.240 The Tanzanian
military eventually toppled the Amin government, putting an end to the atrocities that the
Ugandan people were suffering.
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It has been argued that Tanzania’s primary motive for the invasion was self-interest,241 especially
because Tanzania justified the invasion in self-defense to the initial Ugandan aggression.242
President Nyerere of Tanzania declared thus after the invasion, “[the] war between Tanzania and
Idi Amin’s regime in Uganda was caused by the Ugandan army’s aggression against Tanzania
and Idi Amin’s claim to have annexed part of Ugandan territory. There was no other cause for
it.”243
That notwithstanding, humanitarian concerns played a role in the intervention. The
savage and barbaric acts committed by the Amin government against its people were no secrets
and President Nyerere’s derision for the Amin regime’s atrocities is well-documented.244 Nyerere
had earlier described the Amin regime as a government of “thugs” which the Ugandans had a
right to overthrow.245 The Tanzanian foreign minister described the successful toppling of
Amin’s government as ‘a tremendous victory for the people of Uganda and a singular triumph
for freedom, justice and human dignity’.246
In assessing the validity of Tanzania’s intervention with regards to the legality of
unilateral humanitarian intervention, it is important to note that the world community generally
reacted favorably to it.247 Tanzania was never seriously reprimanded for the intervention though
some claimed the invasion violated international law.248 It is argued that the generally favorable
reaction by the world community to the invasion demonstrate a tacit acceptance of the
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humanitarian intervention principle.249 Teson concludes: “This is surely tantamount to saying
that the international community as a whole recognized in this case the primacy of a modicum of
human dignity over sovereignty.”250 However, the fact that Tanzania never officially claimed
humanitarian reasons as part of the justification for the invasion detracts from the precedential
value of this case with respect to the legality of humanitarian intervention.
2. Interventions After the Cold War,1990-Present
The early 1990’s witnessed changes in the affairs of the international community, and these were
so profound that they would have been unimaginable only a few years before.251 The
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the ‘Eastern Bloc’ with it, and the end of the East-West
hostilities, created a new international political climate. Finally, the SC could perhaps function
the way the drafters of the Charter planned. Lillich rightly expressed the new optimism thus:
“The conclusion of the Cold War … presented a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for the nations of
the world, acting individually, collectively and through the UN …to help achieve two principal
purposes of the UN: the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion and
encouragement of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”252
(a) Selection of Cases
As a result of the restored functioning of the UN, the majority of interventions after 1990
has been authorized by the Security Council, and therefore has to be dismissed from the
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subsequent investigation.253 Therefore, I will only assess a few cases of unilateral humanitarian
intervention.
(i) USA, UK and France in Iraq, 1991
The Kurdish population in Iraq has claimed a right to sovereign status since the late 19th
century. They are however divided between Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, and have been
persecuted to some extent by all these states at one point in time or another.254 In 1985, Saddam
Hussein’s Iraqi government started systematically destroying Kurdish villages and even used
chemical weapons against some settlements, killing as many as 10,000 Kurds.255
In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War in February 1991, Kurdish rebels took
advantage of the unstable political situation and made significant military advances.256 However,
their military gains were short-lived when Iraqi forces again started attacking Kurdish villages
and massacred the civilian population on a large scale. An estimated 1.5 million of a total of 3-4
million of the Kurdish population fled into Turkey and Iran.257 The SC subsequently on April 3,
1991 passed Resolution 668, stating that the SC: “Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civil
population… Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to removing the threat to international peace
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and security in the region, immediately end this repression … Appeals to all Member States and
to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts”.258
This Resolution, though referred to a ‘threat to international peace and security’, it fell
short of authorizing forceful measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.259 It does not mention
any collective enforcement measures and does not expressly authorize any military
intervention.260 The text was a compromise, passed with the least possible support, and it was
clear that such an authorization would never have been accepted by China or the Soviet Union in
the SC.261
However, later in the same month, USA, UK and France announced their plans of
‘Operation Provide Comfort’ to establish ‘safe havens’ and a ‘no-fly-zone’ in Northern Iraq. The
then UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar, expressed concerns that without Iraq’s consent,
their sovereignty would be violated, or ‘consent would have to be sought from the Security
Council’.262
Nevertheless, the proposed intervention by the USA, the UK and France commenced on
April 16. According to President Bush of the USA, the operation was ‘motivated by
humanitarian concerns’.263 The UN Secretary General also acknowledged the importance of
acting from a ‘moral and humanitarian point of view’.264 The British Foreign Minister, Douglas
Hurd, stated that: “[W]e operate under international law. Not every action that a British
Government or an American Government or a French Government takes has to be underwritten
258
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by a specific provision in a UN resolution provided we comply with international law.
International law recognizes extreme humanitarian need”.265
Shortly after the intervention, however, the allied countries tried to make the UN take
responsibility for the operation. Iraqi consent was needed to make it legal and on April 18, an
agreement was reached with Iraq concerning the presence of a limited number of UN troops as
guards and the establishment of 100 civilian aid centers in Iraq. It is thus argued that Iraq
consented in the intervention and it is therefore legal through consent.266
It is the view of this author that the argument that the intervention was carried out with
the acquiescence of Iraq and therefore legal does not hold water. The facts are as simple as these.
A large number of Allied Troops invaded Iraq and Iraq was only later forced to accept a limited
UN presence. The initial intervention never had Iraqi consent and can only be seen as an
intervention for humanitarian purposes. I posit that the view submitted by Malanczuk represents
the true state of affairs with regard to the intervention. He stated that:
Resolution 688 by itself did not provide the legal basis [for the operation]. The legal
significance of the allied action as to state practice, on the other hand, for the development of
customary international law will become apparent only in a longer-term perspective.267
The allied intervention in Northern Iraq can be regarded as a case of humanitarian
intervention. Though the members of the Allied Force made statements that sought to justify the
intervention on humanitarian grounds, they never officially justified the intervention as such. In a
memorandum to the British Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Office, the legal counsel said
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that: “[T]he intervention in northern Iraq “Provide Comfort” was in fact, not specifically
mandated by the United Nations, but the states taking action in northern Iraq did so exercise of
the customary international law principle of humanitarian intervention”.
Similar statements and sentiments were expressed by US officials.268 As indicated earlier,
these statements were never official. That fact is a strong indicator that the Allied States did not
view the principle of humanitarian intervention as legal at the time.
It’s been argued however that the members of the Security Council, by staying silent
about the operation, tacitly accepted the doctrine and acknowledged that such rules were part of
customary law.269 The reason China and the Soviet Union were reluctant to pass a resolution
permitting the use of force was allegedly just that they did not want to set a precedent limiting
the principle of sovereignty.270
However, this author does not think it is right to construe the inaction on the part of the
members of the Security Council as a tacit consent to the intervention by the Allied Forces. I
think that importance should rather be attached to the expressed concerns of the members of the
Security Council about the legality of humanitarian intervention, and not their failure to protest
since the use of the veto makes the Security Council impotent at times.
In summary, the intervention in Northern Iraq cannot be seen as rendering unilateral
humanitarian intervention legal in customary international law. There was no clear expression of
opinio juris by the international community to that effect. But Wheeler notes that:
[T]hese caveats do not alter the fact that the safe havens marked a solidarist moment in
the society of states. It is claiming too much to argue that the silence that greeted Western
268
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action supports a new custom of humanitarian intervention, since international law
requires that there be supporting opinio juris. Yet, by raising new humanitarian claims,
the language of safe havens entered the normative vocabulary of the society of states.271
It is significant to note that though the members of the Allied Forces did not officially
justify the action as one of humanitarian intervention, public statements by leading officials of
the member states of the Allied Forces relied on humanitarian intervention.
(ii) ECOWAS in Liberia, 1990
In December 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor,
invaded the country from La Cote D’Ivoire to overthrow a Samuel Doe regime guilty of massive
human rights abuses in preceding years.272 By August 1990, the NPFL forces controlled most of
the country while Doe still controlled Monrovia. The civil war raged on, with factions separating
from both parties and adding to the chaos. All sides were reportedly murdering and torturing the
civilian population, thousands faced starvation, and an estimated 1.3 million people were either
fleeing the country or were internally displaced.273
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) became concerned and
decided to intervene. The ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee justified the intervention on
the ground that “[T]here is a state of anarchy and total breakdown of Law and order in Liberia.
… These developments have traumatized the Liberian population and greatly shocked the people
of the sub-region and the rest of the international community.”274
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On August 23, 1990, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervened. The
NPFL and other factions that did not want any foreign interference in the conflict however soon
attacked them.275 The ECOMOG succeeded in certain respects, e.g. in establishing a peace treaty
in October 1991 that lasted somewhat longer than the previous ones. However, the fighting never
ceased for long.
The SC passed a resolution on November 19, 1992 (resolution 788), where it stated:
Determining that the deterioration of the situation in Liberia constitutes a threat to
international peace and security…. Recalling the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter
of the United Nations…. Recognising the need for increased humanitarian assistance….
Commends ECOWAS for its efforts to restore peace, security and stability in Liberia….
Requests the Secretary General to dispatch urgently a Special Representative to Liberia to
evaluate the situation….276
This resolution, like its predecessor, resolution 668 that was issued in the Iraqi case, did
not authorize collective use of force. It is also significant to note that the ECOWAS intervention
had long started before the resolution was passed. It was obvious some SC members were
reluctant to authorize the use of force in yet another conflict area, as the aftermath of the Persian
Gulf War had resulted in troubles in Somalia.277
The ECOWAS intervention can be regarded as a multilateral intervention motivated by
humanitarian reasons. It has been claimed that ‘the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia satisfies
virtually every proposed test, and in many respects constitutes an excellent model [of
humanitarian intervention]’.278 However, the real issue is whether the required opinio juris
existed in order to grant it legal status under customary law?
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Though the Security Council did not authorize the intervention, it commended ECOWAS
for its efforts in Liberia, implicitly supporting the intervention. It has been argued that the
members of the Security Council actually recognized the intervention as legal; but were avoiding
creating a precedent that would allow frivolous violations of sovereignty in the future.279 This
argument is however not tenable. The members of the Security Council could have authorized
forceful measures at the outset but they did not, implicitly accepting the illegality of the use of
force in such circumstances. This is further strengthened by the fact that they applauded
ECOWAS for taking the initiative, meaning they recognized the fact that intervention was
essential at the time.
However, the legal significance of the ECOWAS intervention with respect to the legality
of unilateral humanitarian intervention is diminished by the fact that the SC sought to ratify the
action and made it ‘somewhat an action under the auspices of the United Nations’. It does not
therefore offer much help in determining the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention
under customary law. It is however important to note that the SC supported the intervention.
(iii) NATO in Kosovo, 1999
With the final conclusion of the Dayton agreement on 21 November 1995 marking the
end of the Bosnian war, one would have thought that the milestone for the achievement of peace
for the region had arrived.280 However, this dream fizzled into thin air as the treatment meted out
to the Kosovo-Albanians (Kosovars) by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) President,
Slobodan Milosevic, had attained intolerable heights. He had suspended the rights of the
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Kosovars under the 1974 FRY constitution, and implemented strict segregation policies, which
some described as an ‘apartheid system in Kosovo’.281
During the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Climitare e
Kosoves – the UCK) began making efforts to get international attention to the situation in
Kosovo.282 They thought that the pacifist boycott-policy was worsening their plight, by securing
Serb control over a region where about 90% of the population was Albanian.283
The FRY army increased the tempo of attacks on the UCK, intensifying the conflict in
the process. It was however not until early 1998 that the international community took a serious
look at the situation. On March 31, 1998, the SC passed resolution 1160, in which it condemned
‘the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrations
in Kosovo, as well as acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army’. But this resolution did
not prescribe any solution to the conflict, but did impose a weapons embargo and called on the
parties to resolve the conflict ‘through dialogue’.
The hostilities continued and it became clear in no time that the Serbs attacks on the UCK
were resulting in the civilian population of Kosovo fleeing into Albania and Macedonia. The
Security Council subsequently on September 23, 1998 passed resolution 119, stating as follows:
Affirming that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region…. Demands …that
the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian
leadership take immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation and to avert the
impending humanitarian catastrophe. 284
Although the situation was now widely regarded as a case falling under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, the demands made in the resolution were not backed by a threat of military
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action. A clear authorization by the SC to use force was not feasible, as both China and Russia
would veto any such proposal.285
The hostilities continued and the humanitarian concerns became more pressing. The
NATO countries decided to take action. On 13 October 1998 they issued an activation order for
air strikes if the Serbs did not stop their indiscriminate attacks on Kosovar settlements.286 In the
last moment however, the NATO sent US Special Envoy Holbrooke to Belgrade, and he
persuaded Milosevic to accept a cease-fire and the presence of some inspectors from the
Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This resulted in a cease-fire, albeit
temporary.
This fragile cease-fire was again shattered when the UCK, which was left out of the
OSCE agreement, refused to respect it. In retaliation, the FRY forces massacred 45 civilians in
the village of Racak, an event that shocked the world community.287 NATO invited the parties to
Rambouillet outside Paris in a last effort to secure peace. Here, the UCK agreed to drop their
demand for total independence, and the FRY would in turn have to accept the presence of a
NATO force in Kosovo. These terms were unacceptable to the Serbs, who began a new
campaign of ethnic cleansing of Kosovo.288
The NATO countries made a last minute plea for restraint but Milosevic failed to oblige.
Subsequently, NATO started launching air strikes against the FRY on March 23, 1999. The
following rationales have been offered as possible justifications for NATO’s intervention,289
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though most of them do not warrant any serious consideration in so far as the legality of the
intervention is concerned.
First, that NATO’s credibility as a collective defense organization was at stake. However,
this can obviously not serve as a legal justification for waging war under customary international
law.290 This ground therefore has no importance on the issue of the legality of unilateral
humanitarian intervention.
Second, it has been argued that the intervention was in conformity with SC resolutions.
But since China and Russia obviously opposed to the intervention, both in the debate in the SC
and when it was a fait accompli, this was also an evident misconception291 and does not help in
resolving the issue of the legality of the intervention so far as the rules of customary law are
concerned.
Perhaps, the rationale that generated the most debate was the one which sought to justify
the action on humanitarian grounds. It was postulated that the action was aimed at averting an
impending catastrophe. This is also the only basis on which the intervention can possibly be
legal. Thus, the British Foreign Secretary stated in Parliament, “We were left with no other way
of preventing the present humanitarian crisis from becoming a catastrophe than by taking
military action to limit the capacity of Milosevic’s army to repress the Kosovar Albanians”.292
The importance of this intervention with regards to the legality of unilateral humanitarian
intervention can be assessed from the reaction of the world community after the action. Most
western states supported the action of NATO. Britain reiterated its previous justification of the
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Iraqi intervention, and argued that humanitarian intervention was legal under customary
international law.293 On the other hand, a Chinese official characterized the operation as
‘absolute gunboat diplomacy’,294 and the Russian UN Ambassador stated that “[W]hat is in the
balance now is the question of law and lawlessness. It is a question of either reaffirming the
commitment of one’s country and people to the basic principles and values of the United Nations
Charter, or tolerating a situation I which gross force dictates realpolitik”.295
On March 26, 1999, Russia, with the support of India and Belarus, presented a draft
resolution condemning the operation as unlawful under the UN Charter. Significantly, the draft
resolution was defeated by a vote of twelve, among them six non-western countries, to three.296
For the first time, the members of the Security Council did not vote to condemn the use of force
for a humanitarian purpose.297 Moreover, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed
limited support for the intervention,298 when he stated in 1999:
[T]his year’s conflict in Kosovo raised equally important questions about the
consequences of action without international consensus and clear legal authority… On
the one hand is it legitimate for a regional organization to use force without a UN
mandate? On the other, is it permissible to let gross and systematic violations of human
rights, with grave humanitarian consequences, continue unchecked?299
Finally, ‘no strong opposition…. emerged in the majority of Member States of the United
Nations’.300 The legal significance of the case stems from the fact that it was no longer just the
‘exaggeration of jurists sympathetic to humanitarian intervention, but, rather, the real working
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and practice of States’,301 as it was expressed in the UN fora, which supported the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention.
D. CONCLUSION: STATUS OF UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A critical assessment of the cases of unilateral humanitarian interventions discussed
above indicates that the doctrine is becoming more and more acceptable to the majority of states
in the world. The invasion of Iraq by the UK, France and US received very little support from the
community of states. Even though, the UK, especially sought to rely on customary law rules
permitting humanitarian intervention, it is clear that the opinio juris needed to support a rule of
customary international law was absent.
The subsequent cases however seems to have gained some support from the international
community, and especially, from the UN. The UN commended the ECOWAS for their
intervention in Liberia in a number of resolutions. Even though NATO did not enjoy an
overwhelming support from the UN as the ECOWAS, the comprehensive manner in which the
SC rejected a proposed draft legislation, which sought to declare the intervention legal, offers
NATO some support from the world body. The UN Secretary General himself offered implicitly
offered support to NATO when he questioned thus: “... On the other, is it permissible to let gross
and systematic violations of human rights, with grave humanitarian consequences, continue
unchecked?”302
It is clear that with the support received by the ECOWAS and NATO in their respective
interventions for humanitarian purposes, there is in transition a rule of customary international
law that would permit unilateral humanitarian intervention. The rule is however not yet fully
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crystallized and therefore does not form part of the body of rules recognized as belonging to the
customary international law tradition.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
The doctrine of unilateral humanitarian intervention is important and morally necessary
in today’s world. It is pathetic to allow human beings to suffer without any help just because of
legal theories. Unfortunately, the rules of international law presently do not permit unilateral
humanitarian interventions.
I must quickly point out that notwithstanding the important role of the doctrine; it is a
doctrine that would be abused if a proper criterion were not put in place to regulate its use.
Despite the possibility of abuse, the doctrine is very vital to the protection of human rights and
world peace and must be maintained. However, it is essential that a proper formula be put in
place to regulate its use.
The best way to put in place a system that would ensure that the doctrine is maintained
and properly regulated is for the UN draft guidelines on humanitarian interventions. The
provisions of the UN Charter should be amended to permit humanitarian interventions when
stated conditions are met. The UN has to put in place a criterion that must be met before
humanitarian interventions can be undertaken. I acknowledge it would be difficult to achieve a
consensus at the UN since some states still prefer ‘absolute sovereignty’. However, the difficulty
is not insurmountable.
I humbly suggest that the following measures may be of assistance in any coherent theory
that seeks to regulate humanitarian interventions. First, the Security Council should be notified
by a state contemplating humanitarian intervention.
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No state should intervene unilaterally until the SC fails to act within a reasonable time after it has
been notified of the situation warranting intervention.
Second, it must be established that the violations of human rights in the target state is
significant and amount to the level that ‘shocks the conscience of the world’. The rights violated
should be the most basic of human rights. Thus, human rights violations that are not so serious
should not warrant any unilateral intervention.
Third, all measures short of the use of force should have been employed in trying to
curtail the human rights violations before humanitarian interventions should be contemplated.
Thus, the state contemplating humanitarian intervention must furnish the SC with measures not
involving the use of armed force that has been taken in order to end the atrocities. These
measures should have proved to be insufficient or there must be strong reasons to believe that
these measures will not be fruitful.
Fourth, the intervening country’s own human rights record must be scrutinized to ensure
that countries with bad human rights records are prohibited from undertaking humanitarian
interventions. Further, proper scrutiny should be undertaken by the Security Council to ensure
that the overriding objective for the intervention is to curtail human rights violations.
Finally, the length of the intervention must not be longer than necessary to bring an end
to the human rights violations. Thus, the intervening state must promptly leave the target state as
soon as it can be proved that the task of eradicating the human rights violations has been
accomplished.
If all these suggestions are implemented, I believe the concerns regarding the abuse of
humanitarian interventions would be minimized and the doctrine would be generally accepted.
There is no doubt that the doctrine is necessary in today’s world.
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